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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 900484-CA 
Category No* 2 
REPLY BRIEF 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief. 
REPLY TO POINT I 
THIS COURT, EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION, SHOULD 
CONSIDER ABANDONING THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE IN 
THE CONTEXT OF INVESTIGATORY STOPS OF 
VEHICLES; ALTERNATIVELY, IT SHOULD CLARIFY 
THE DOCTRINE AS ADOPTED IN STATE V. SIERRA. 
A. Waiver 
In Part A of Point I in defendant's brief, he argues 
that the State is procedurally barred from arguing that this 
Court should abandon the pretext stop doctrine it adopted in 
State v. Sierra, 752 P.2d 972, 977-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). 
First, he argues that, because the State asserted in 
the trial court that the Sierra pretext analysis controlled the 
resolution of defendant's pretext challenge, its invitation to 
this Court to abandon Sierra is inconsistent with its position 
below and therefore should not be considered on appeal. The 
basic flaw in this argument is that the State could not ask the 
trial court to overrule or not follow Sierra, the lower court 
having no authority to do so. £f. State v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 21, 25 n.2 (Utah July 3, 1991) ("[T]he court of appeals has 
no power to overrule a decision of this Court."). Therefore, the 
State can properly ask this Court to reconsider Sierra as part of 
this appeal, even though it did not raise the issue below. 
Second, defendant argues that the State's invitation to 
reconsider Sierra should not be addressed because that issue was 
not included in the State's petition for permission to appeal. 
This argument is more substantial. The State concedes that it 
did not include that issue in its petition. Quite simply, the 
issue was not apparent to the State at the time the petition was 
filed. While this Court could appropriately decline to address 
this issue due to its absence in the petition, there is nothing 
in rule 5(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that prohibits 
the Court from addressing the point in spite of the defect in the 
State's petition. And, even if rule 5(e) could be read in such a 
manner, rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, would allow 
consideration of the issue under a suspension of the rules. 
Because the issue is an important one, and has bcsen analyzed 
thoroughly by defendant, the Court, in its discretion, should 
address the issue. 
B. Retention of the Pretext Stop Doctrine 
In explaining why the pretext doctrine is important, 
2 
defendant relies on certain passages from Sierra and State v. 
Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1972), which discuss primarily the 
evils of pretextual arrests, as opposed to pretextual traffic 
stops. Br, of Appellee at 12-14. The quotes from Sierra require 
some analysis. 
The Sierra Court recognized that "it is impermissible 
for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a 
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime." 754 
P.2d at 977 (citing United States v. Millio, 588 F. Supp. 45, 49 
(W.D.N.Y. 1984)) (emphasis added). The obvious danger with 
pretextual misdemeanor arrests is that when an arrest occurs, the 
police may, incident to the arrest and without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, conduct a complete search of the 
arrested person. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
Furthermore, the police may, incident to an arrest and without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle and any containers found within the 
passenger compartment. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
Thus, because the potential for intrusion on an individual's 
privacy interests is so great when an arrest is made, courts are 
justifiably concerned with the threat posed by pretextual 
misdemeanor traffic arrests. However, Sierra extended the 
pretext arrest doctrine to the traffic stop 
situation, where the potential for lawful intrusion on an 
) 
3 
individual's privacy interests is not nearly so great.1 
"[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a 
computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver 
has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement 
to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his way 
without being subject to further delay by police for additional 
questioning.'" State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Any further investigative detention is justified 
1
 Without discussing this distinction, the Sierra Court, in 
the passage quoted by defendant at page 14 of his brief, 
inappropriately inserted the words "pretextual traffic stop" in 
quoted text from Professor LaFave's treatise on search and 
seizure. LaFave, noting that there is a "powerful reason for 
being concerned about the unquestioned application to traffic 
violation cases of the 'general authority' to search incident to 
arrest," states: 
"There is . . . always the possibility that a 
police officer, lacking probable cause to 
obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic 
arrest as a pretext to conduct a search." 
Given the fact . . . that "in most 
jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses 
the determination of whether to issue a 
citation or effect a full arrest is 
discretionary with the officer," and that 
"very few drivers can traverse any 
appreciable distance without violating some 
traffic regulation," this is indeed a 
frightening possibility. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 5.2(e) at 457-58 (2d ed. 1987) 
(footnote citation omitted). The Sierra Court's insertion of 
"pretextual traffic stops" in brackets after the word "this" near 
the end of the quoted section, 754 P.2d at 979, is inaccurate, in 
that LaFave is discussing only a pretextual traffic arrest and 
the search conducted incident thereto, not a pretextual traffic 
stop where the police have no automatic right to conduct a 
suspicionless, warrantless search of either the person or the 
vehicle. 
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under the fourth amendment only if the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Ibid. In short, there are clear 
restrictions on the scope of a traffic stop, and the intrusion on 
an individual's privacy interests during such a stop is not 
nearly as substantial as the intrusion associated with a full 
custodial traffic arrest. 
Accordingly, the State's argument that this Court 
should abandon the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is directed 
only at traffic stops and does not extend to misdemeanor traffic 
arrests. The State shares defendant's concern that a misdemeanor 
traffic arrest could be misused by a police officer as a pretext 
to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested person and 
his or her vehicle without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, 
or a warrant. While an officer appears to have the authority to 
arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation under Utah law2, that 
clearly is not the usual practice. 
The position set forth in State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App. 
380, 786 P.2d 734 (Or. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 
1990), which was decided under the fourth amendment and article 
I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution3, should be adopted by 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990) and Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-18 (Supp. 1991). But see United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 
812, 816 n.l (10th Cir. 1991) (M[I]t appears that Utah law does 
not allow an officer in these circumstances to make a custodial 
arrest for a speeding violation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-18 et 
seq.")• 
3
 Article I, section 9 is Oregon's state constitutional 
counterpart to the fourth amendment and is similar in that 
respect to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
5 
this Court. There, two police officers were conducting 
surveillance of a Portland motel room associated with drug 
dealing when they saw the defendant and a passenger drive up and 
look in the window. When the defendant drove away, the officers 
followed him, hoping to be led to the persons who had been 
selling narcotics out of the room. Eventually, the officers 
stopped the defendant for speeding so that they could identify 
him and his passenger and gather information. One officer asked 
the defendant for his driver's license and ,rtold him he was going 
a little fast." The defendant replied that he had no license and 
presented several traffic tickets to the officer. At that point, 
the other officer indicated that the defendant's passenger was 
smoking marijuana. When asked if he had any marijuana, the 
defendant replied that he had none and offered to allow the 
officer to search the car. A subsequent search produced a 
quantity of tar heroin, and defendant was arrested for drug 
crimes. 786 P.2d at 735. 
The defendant argued that the initial stop for speeding 
was pretextual n[b]ecause a reasonable officer . . . would not 
have stopped defendant in the absence of a desire to gather drug 
intelligence.H 786 P.2d at 736. The court rejected this 
argument, citing the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 595 P.2d 1364 (1979), which "held that a 
traffic stop is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment 'simply 
because, in addition to probable cause to arrest for a specific 
offense (or to stop for purposes of issuing a citation), the 
6 
officer also has a suspicion which contributes to the decision to 
make the stop.'" Ibid, (quoting Tucker, 286 Or. at 493, 595 P.2d 
1364).* The Olaiz court quoted the following language from 
Tucker and concluded that the Oregon Supreme Court's "reasoning 
is as sound under Article I, section 9 [of the Oregon 
Constitution] as it is under the Fourth Amendment": 
[We do not] believe that determining the 
validity of an otherwise authorized stop on 
the basis of the officer's purpose, or 
primary purpose, in making it would be either 
practical or desirable. 
• . . • 
[T]his approach would be unworkable. Any 
time evidence of criminal activity came to 
light during a routine traffic stop, trial 
courts would be called upon to decide whether 
the officer had noticed anything about the 
violator or the vehicle beyond the fact of 
the violation itself, and, if so, whether he 
would have made the stop upon the 
hypothetical supposition that he had noticed 
nothing. 
786 P.2d at 736-37 (quoting Tucker, 286 Or. at 493, 495, 595 P.2d 
1364). In short, "[w]hether the officers would have stopped 
defendant for speeding (or for a more serious infraction, had one 
occurred) without their desire to know more about the car's 
occupants is irrelevant." JLd. at 737. 
Finally, specifically addressing the defendant's 
pretext stop argument under the state constitution, the court 
noted that "'[a]n officer who stops a vehicle when he sees its 
A
 See also State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citing Tucker with approval and stating: "The fact that 
Officer Smith's attention was initially drawn to the defendant's 
car because of what he considered suspicious activity in a high-
crime area does not insulate the defendant from being stopped for 
a traffic violation."). 
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operator commit a traffic violation does not interfere with the 
operator's freedom of movement based only on the officer's 
'standardless and unconstrained discretion,'" and that "once the 
officer has made the stop, unless circumstances arise that give 
cause to inquire further, his activities are limited to ones 
related to the traffic stop." Ibid, (quoting Tucker, 286 Or. at 
492, 595 P.2d 1364).5 
C. Clarification of Sierra Pretext Stop Doctrine 
If the Court retains Sierra's pretext stop doctrine, it 
should clarify the doctrine's operation. Although the parties 
agree on this point, they differ on how the pretext stop doctrine 
should be applied. 
The following areas require clarification: (1) Is the 
subjective intent of the officer relevant to the determination of 
whether a pretext stop has occurred? (2) Which party has the 
ultimate burden of proof on the pretext stop issue? 
On the question of whether the officer's subjective 
intent should be considered in determining if a pretext stop has 
occurred, Sierra correctly states that "the subjective intent of 
the officer is irrelevant." 754 P.2d at 977. This is entirely 
consistent with the "hypothetical reasonable officer" test which 
is a purely objective test. JEd. at 977-78. The problem has not 
been with the Court's statement of the law, but rather, as noted 
5
 Olaiz's traffic stop analysis is independent from the 
traditional pretext arrest analysis which, as the State has 
argued for here, remains as a viable separate doctrine in Oregon. 
See Tucker, 286 Or. at 490 n.4, 595 P.2d at 1367 n.4. 
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in the State's opening brief, with its application of the law. 
The Court simply has not consistently adhered to the principle 
that the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to the pretext 
stop inquiry. See Br. of Appellant at 13. Therefore, the Court 
should make absolutely clear that an officer's subjective intent 
will not be considered. 
The Court should reject defendant's argument that the 
officer's subjective intent is an appropriate consideration. If 
subjective intent is included in the equation, the hypothetical 
reasonable officer test no longer exists, and the door is opened 
for testimony from police officers who, as noted by defendant, 
Mcan readily adapt their testimony to reflect the state of mind 
necessary to justify the scope of their actions." Br. of 
Appellee at 17 (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 
1516 (10th Cir. 1988)). An objective test, which does not take 
into account the officer's motives — good or bad, is simply more 
susceptible to consistent application, which promotes the 
development of clear principles of law that are more easily 
recognized and followed by law enforcement. 
As to the second question on which party carries the 
ultimate burden of proof on the pretext issue, the State has 
argued in another case pending before this Court, State v. Salas, 
No. 900418-CA (set for oral argument August 29, 1991), that 
"[wjhen alleging that a pretext stop has occurred, a defendant 
should bear the burden of proving that allegation, once the State 
has born[e] its original burden of showing the constitutionality 
9 
of the stop (i.e. that the police officer had reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to believe that the defendant was 
violating the law)." Br. of Appellee (citing State v. Loveqren, 
798 P.2d 767, 771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (which suggests that, 
when alleging a pretext stop, a defendant bears some burden in 
showing that a hypothetical reasonable officer would not have 
made a particular traffic stop); United States v. Lewis, 910 F.2d 
1367, 1371 (7th Cir. 1990)). While defendant makes a reasonable 
argument for a contrary rule, it appears to conflict with 
footnote 10 of Loveqren. But see State v. Vigil/ 164 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 31 (Utah Ct. App. June 21, 1991) ("We are precluded from 
meaningful review of whether the state met its burden to show . . 
. the initial stop was actually pretextual . . . . " ) . In any 
event, the Court needs to clarify who has the ultimate burden of 
proof on the pretext stop question. 
REPLY TO POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT RULE THAT THE STATE HAS 
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE 
ADEQUACY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ON THE 
SUPPRESSION ISSUES. 
Defendant argues that the State, by failing to object 
below to the adequacy of the trial court's findings, has waived 
its right to request on appeal a remand for adequate findings as 
required under State v. Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). However, an appealing party's failure to object to 
the adequacy of the trial court's findings on suppression issues 
has never resulted in automatic affirmance of the lower court's 
ruling, which appears to be the result defendant argues for, in 
10 
that he cannot seriously claim that the trial court's findings 
are the detailed findings required under Lovegren or that 
meaningful review could proceed based on those findings. When 
the findings are inadequate, this Court has consistently remanded 
the case for adequate findings so that the appealing party's 
claims can be meaningfully reviewed. E.g. State v. Vigil, 164 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 31; Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 770. The same 
procedure should apply here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand the case 
for entry of adequate findings of fact which should include a 
ruling only on whether the vehicle stop was lawful under Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
Alternatively, the Court should remand the case for 
entry of adequate findings of fact and consideration of whether 
the stop of defendant was pretextual under the standard set forth 
in State v. Sierra. * 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j£_T day of August, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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